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P*: Not the Inflation Forecaster's Holy Grail 
Lawrence J. Christiano 
Research Officer 
Research Department 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Last summer, the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System unveiled a new, experimental way to 
forecast trends in inflation, which it calls P-Star (P*). 
The announcement received an enormous amount of 
publicity throughout—and even outside—the United 
States. One journalist captured the excitement and 
optimism generated by the new forecasting method 
particularly well: "Economists have long been search-
ing for the holy grail—an accurate thermometer with 
which to forecast inflation. . . . Some think they have 
found it."
1 
They haven't. At first glance, P* may look like an 
especially good way to forecast inflation. But a closer 
look raises doubts about that. And those doubts are 
confirmed by some simple tests of its forecasting 
ability. Had P* been used to forecast inflation in the 
1970s and 1980s, its track record would not have been 
much better than those of other forecasting methods. 
While P* may not be a bad way to forecast inflation, it is 
certainly not an exceptionally good way either. 
What's So Appealing About P*? 
This new inflation forecasting method is appealing to 
many people because it is fairly simple, it seems to 
make sense, and it is consistent with a widely respected 
theory of what causes inflation in the long run. 
It's Simple... 
As an inflation forecasting method, P* can be described 
with just a few simple equations. 
One equation states an obvious fact: at any time in 
an economy, the number of dollars spent or received 
equals the number of dollars changing hands. Since 
early in the century (Fisher 1911), economists have 
expressed this fact as the equation of exchange: 
(1) PXQ = MXV 
where 
P = the current price level 
(here, I'll use the implicit price deflator of gross 
national product, or GNP) 
Q = the current level of output, adjusted for 
inflation 
(here, real GNP) 
M — the current money supply 
(here, the Fed's M2 definition of money)
2 
V = the velocity of money 
(the number of times each dollar of the money 
supply is spent each year). 
t Revision of a speech to the Board of Directors of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Minneapolis on November 16,1989. The speech updates the author's report 
of December 12, 1988. The author has benefited from comments by Jeffrey 
Hallman, Richard Porter, and David Small. 
JThe Board's new forecasting method is described in Hallman, Porter, and 
Small 1989. The above quotation is from the Economist (Business/Economics 
focus, 1989). Other P* publicity includes a front-page story in the New York 
Times (Kilborn 1989), two stories in the business section of a Sunday New York 
Times (Hunt 1989 and Lee 1989), and stories in Business Week (McNamee 
1989) and the American Banker (Heinemann 1989). 
2M2 includes (1) the components of the Fed's Ml definition of money 
[currency held by the public, travelers' checks of nonbank issuers, demand 
deposits at banks and thrifts, negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW and Super-
3 Those interested in using this equation to study inflation 
can rearrange its parts to solve for the current price 
level: 
(2) P = MX V/Q. 
Economists at the Federal Reserve Board have trans-
formed this equation into a potentially useful forecast-
Charts 1 and 2 
Two Parts of P* 
Quarterly, 1959:1-1989:3 
Chart 1 The Velocity of Money 
Number of Times Each Dollar of M2 Is Spent Each Year 
Chart 2 Real Output 
Trii. of Level Gross National Product, Adjusted for Inflation 
Sources: Federal Reserve Board of Governors; U.S. Department of Commerce; 
Hallman, Porter, and Small 1989 
ing tool by making two assumptions about two of its 
parts: V and Q. First, they assume that no matter where 
V and Q happen to be at any time, these variables al-
ways tend reasonably quickly (say, within two or three 
years) toward equilibrium (or long-run) values, which 
the Board economists call V* and Q*. Second, the 
economists assume that at any time these equilibrium 
values are easily computed from the available historical 
data. In particular, V* is just the annual average of V 
since World War II, which is around 1.65. (See Chart 1.) 
And Q* is the full capacity level of output—potential 
output—in the economy, which is assumed to be the 
smooth trend path of real GNP. The Board economists 
measure Q* as growing at a constant 2.5 percent annual 
rate since about 1981.
3 (See Chart 2.) 
The Board economists combine V* and 0* with the 
rearranged equation of exchange (2) to produce one 
more equation, this one for what they call P*: the price 
level that would occur with the current stock of money 
if V and Q were at their equilibrium values, 
(3) P* = MX V*/Q*. 
The significance of this equation for forecasting infla-
tion over the next few years can be seen by comparing 
it with equation (2) and making use of the Board econo-
mists' assumptions. Obviously, the only way P and P* 
can differ is by V differing from V* or Q differing from 
(2* or both. But, the assumptions say, if these variables 
ever differ, then over a few years, their equality will be 
restored as V and Q drift toward their long-run values of 
V* and Q*. What this means, of course, is that over a 
few years P will tend to drift toward P*. Therefore, if at 
any time P exceeds P*, then the rate of growth in P (in-
flation) can be expected to fall for the next few years as 
P moves down toward P*; and if Pis ever less than P*, 
inflation can be expected to rise. This temporarily lower 
or higher rate of inflation can be expected to continue 
until P= P*, at which time the inflation rate will settle 
NOW) accounts, automatic transfer service (ATS) accounts, and credit union 
share draft accounts], (2) savings and small-denomination (less than $ 100,000) 
time deposits, (3) money market deposit accounts (MMDAs), (4) shares in 
noninstitutional money market mutual funds, (5) overnight repurchase agree-
ments (RPs), and (6) overnight Eurodollar deposits issued to U.S. residents by 
foreign branches of U.S. banks. For more details on the Fed's money stock 
definitions, see Walter 1989. 
3The Board economists estimated Q* for the period from the first quarter of 
1952 (1952:1) to the third quarter of 1989 (1989:3). To see how their measure 
of Q* is constructed, it is revealing to look not directly at Q*, but rather at 400 X 
log(@*). This is simply four straight lines, with different slopes, joined end to 
end. Because the slopes refer to 400 X log(£?*), they are the annualized 
percentage changes in Q*. The beginning and ending dates and the slopes of the 
four linear segments of 400 X log(0*) are 1952:1-1965:2, 3.373; 1965:3-
1973:4,3.466; 1974:1-1980:1, 2.795; and 1980:2-1989:3,2.497. 
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down to its long-run average, the growth rate of P*. 
Since the Board economists assume that V* is 
constant and that <2* will continue to grow at 2.5 
percent, the growth of P* depends on the growth of Mt 
how much greater that is than the growth of Q*. In other 
words, the long-run inflation rate implied by the P* 
analysis equals the difference between the long-run 
growth rates of the money supply and potential output. 
The P* inflation prediction is easy to illustrate 
graphically. Consider Chart 3. There, the P* curve as-
sumes that the long-run annual growth rates of money 
and output are 7 and 2.5 percent, so that the annual 
growth rate of P*—that is, the long-run inflation rate— 
is 4.5 percent. The curve traces the path P* takes over 
six years, assuming (for simplicity) it starts at 1. The 
chart depicts two imaginary situations with regard to 
the current price level, P. In one, P starts above P*, with 
a value of 1.2; in the other, P starts below P*, with a 
value of 0.8. Note how, from either side, P moves 
substantially closer to P* within three years and how 
this requires that for a time P grow less or more rapidly 
than P*. The relative speed of growth shows in the 
relative slopes of the curves. This is dramatized in Chart 
4, which plots the year-over-year average growth rates 
of all variables in Chart 3. Note how P* grows 4.5 
percent throughout and how inflation is temporarily 
higher than that when P starts low and temporarily 
lower when P starts high. 
. . . And Plausible and Well-Connected 
In addition to this simplicity, the P* analysis has at least 
two other characteristics that some people find appeal-
ing. 
One is that its assumptions seem plausible. Recall 
that the P* analysis assumes that the long-run rate 
money changes hands (V*) and the rate potential output 
(£?*) grows are constant over the few years that P moves 
toward P*. Many people find those assumptions rea-
sonable because a few years seems too short a time for 
significant changes to occur in long-run variables such 
as these which are dependent on slowly changing things 
like habits and technology. 
The other appealing characteristic is P*'s consisten-
cy with the widely accepted quantity theory of money 
(particularly as defined by Lucas 1986). Loosely, this 
theory says that over a period of many years, where M 
goes, only P follows. That is, in terms of long-run 
average growth rates, a one percentage point change 
in money growth shows up only as a one percentage 
point change in inflation, without changing output 
growth at all.
4 This idea can be seen in the P* analysis, 
Charts 3 and 4 
How P* Works 
Imaginary Situations in Which the Price Level (P) 
Is Higher or Lower Than Its Long-Run Average (P*)t 
Chart 3 The Price Level 
Years 
Chart 4 The Inflation Rate 
6 
Years 
tThe P* curves assume that money and output grow at annual rates of 7% and 2.5%. 
4 For a discussion of the empirical plausibility of the proposition that, in the 
long run, an increase in the money growth rate ultimately shows up one-for-one 
in inflation, not in output, see Lucas 1980, 1986; Barro 1987, chap. 7; and 
Dwyer and Hafer 1988. 
5 too: its assumption that Q* grows smoothly is consis-
tent with the idea that Q*'s growth is not affected by 
changes in M. Many people seem to think that consis-
tency with the quantity theory adds credence to P*. 
A Closer Look 
It doesn't. In fact, neither of the last two reasons people 
seem to like P* holds up under scrutiny. And at least one 
of these failings has potentially serious implications for 
the usefulness of P* as a monetary policy tool. 
True, P* is consistent with the quantity theory. But 
that consistency is irrelevant to P*'s forecasting ability. 
For the consistency here is between ideas about infla-
tion over the long run—a period of perhaps 10-20 
years. As we have seen, P*'s forecasts are for inflation 
over a much shorter period, only 2-3 years. The 
quantity theory says nothing about that period. So the 
agreement between P* and the quantity theory says 
nothing about P*'s ability to predict inflation in the 
shorter run. 
Also questionable is the plausibility of P*'s assump-
tions. Recall that these assumptions are, in short, that 
velocity will eventually return to its historical average 
(V*) and that the level of output will return to its 
historical trend (2*). If either of these assumptions is 
wrong, then the P* analysis could seriously mislead 
anyone using it to make policy decisions. And today 
there is ample evidence that both of these assumptions 
may be wrong. 
Consider the assumption about velocity. Suppose for 
some reason the average value of V were to drop 
permanently, but the P* analysis were used with the 
historical average. Then P in (2) would drop below P* 
as Vfell and V* in (3) continued to be held fixed, and the 
P* analysis would falsely signal an imminent danger of 
inflation. Actually, this may have happened after late 
1982 when financial innovations such as money market 
deposit accounts and Super-NOW accounts were intro-
duced. Since then, M2 velocity has almost always been 
below V* (Chart 1). Those who think this reflects a 
permanent drop in velocity say it reflects the reduced 
opportunity cost of holding M2 due to the fact that these 
new types of accounts pay explicit interest. 
Similarly, consider the assumption about the econo-
my's underlying trend level of output. Suppose that its 
growth rate were to accelerate, but that this accelera-
tion were not taken into account in the P* analysis.
5 
Then P would be driven below P*, and once again the 
analysis would falsely warn of inflation. The notion that 
the growth rate of potential or trend output should shift 
abruptly is actually pretty reasonable. Even the Board's 
historical record of Q* displays periodic, abrupt shifts in 
its growth rate. Before the first oil price shock, in the 
early 1970s, for example, Q*'s growth rate was around 
3.4 percent. Just after the oil shock, its growth rate 
dropped to 2.8 percent, and with the second oil shock, in 
the late 1970s, it fell again, to 2.5 percent. (See footnote 
3 for more details.) 
In either of the above two situations, if the Fed were 
paying close attention to the P* analysis, it might be 
tempted into a needless and potentially harmful credit 
contraction. 
How Well Does It Forecast? 
Still, the fact that the P* method requires some 
assumptions that may be false does not necessarily 
mean it will not work well. All forecasting methods 
require assumptions that are false at some level. This 
does not necessarily imply that they will forecast 
poorly. The only reasonable basis for evaluating a 
forecasting method is how well it does what it's 
supposed to do: forecast. I test P* here, using two 
different approaches. And while P* doesn't do badly, it 
doesn't do especially well either. 
Qualitatively, Not Clear 
My first approach is qualitative. How well would P* 
have predicted the direction of the major changes in 
U.S. inflation since World War II? The answer, unfor-
tunately, is not clear. 
The postwar price experience is dominated by two 
events: the dramatic rise of inflation in the 1970s and its 
fall in the 1980s. I do a graphical analysis to investigate 
whether P* would have helped policymakers anticipate 
these events. 
Chart 5 shows measures of inflation, the price level, 
and P* over the last 30 years. Look first at inflation's 
unprecedented rise to double digits in the late 1970s. 
Would the P* analysis have predicted that rise? Maybe, 
according to this chart. From 1963 until 1970, P* 
exceeded P} apparently successfully forecasting the 
accelerating pace in inflation. But twice P* stopped 
signaling the alarm: during 1970 and from the second 
half of 1974 until the second half of 1976. It did this 
even though the underlying inflation rate clearly had 
not yet fallen. Thus, the evidence on whether P* would 
have signaled the big rise is somewhat mixed, though on 
balance it seems to be reasonably positive. What about 
5The work of Nelson and Plosser (1982) suggests another sense in which 
this assumption may be wrong: output may not revert to any underlying, stable 
trend. More recently, the academic literature appears to be moving toward a 
consensus that little can reliably be said about the underlying trend properties of 
real GNP. See Cochrane 1988, Christiano and Eichenbaum 1989, and Sims 
1989. 
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the big fall? Here P* gives a sharper, less ambiguous 
signal. The actual price level, P, was consistently above 
P* from mid-1978 to mid-1985, clearly predicting low-
er inflation ahead. 
What about since the big fall? Since 1985 until very 
recently, the P* analysis predicted a rise in inflation, 
though inflation has remained fairly stable at a low 
level. What this means is hard to say. It could have at 
least two interpretations. One is that P* was right. It was 
correctly signaling the threat of rising inflation, and the 
Fed's gradual credit-tightening moves since 1987 
eliminated the threat. This idea is consistent with the 
facts that starting in 1987 there was some upward 
pressure on inflation and now P* coincides with the 
actual price level. The other interpretation of the recent 
data, of course, is that P* was wrong. This could be true, 
as noted before, if its assumptions are wrong. In par-
ticular, the fall of P below P* could just reflect some 
combination of a rise in the growth rate of potential 
output and a fall in velocity. 
Chart 5 
How Well P* Works: Qualitatively ... 
Level and Annualized % Change in the GNP Deflator and Level of P*t 
Quarterly, 1959:1-1989:3 
Shaded areas indicate periods when P* signals an imminent rise in inflation (P*>P). 
Obviously, although a qualitative analysis like this is 
a good, simple way to start evaluating a new forecasting 
method, it is not good enough for most people who want 
to know how well that method can really forecast. As 
we have seen, a qualitative approach doesn't give clear 
answers about P*'s ability to predict even dramatic 
changes in inflation. Partly that is because it doesn't 
give quantitative forecasts of inflation, which is what 
most forecasters want anyway: how much will inflation 
change and when? A quantitative analysis should be 
less ambiguous, too, since it can weigh the pluses 
against the minuses. Also, the evaluation has so far not 
been comparative; where does P* rank relative to other 
methods of forecasting inflation? Those who call P* the 
holy grail of inflation forecasting seem to think it is far 
superior to all competitors. Is it? 
Quantitatively, Not Clearly Better 
To answer such questions, we need more than just the 
simple separate P and P* equations. A comparison of P 
fP* is constructed using equation (3). 
Sources: Federal Reserve Board ot Governors; U.S. Department of Commerce; 
Hallman, Porter, and Small 1989 
7 and P* can suggest the direction in which inflation will 
be moving, but not how much it will move or when. To 
determine things like that, we must build P and P* into 
an explicit statement of what determines future infla-
tion and how, that is, into a mathematical model. 
Economists at the Federal Reserve Board have done 
this by starting with a simple benchmark model that 
forecasts future inflation by just extrapolating, or 
projecting, past inflation. The Board economists incor-
porate P*/Pinto that model. According to the resulting 
model, if P*/Pis large (meaning P* is much greater than 
P), then the forecasted level of inflation is higher than 
would be indicated by extrapolating past inflation 
alone. This is the P* model I will test. 
To keep this test simple, I will start by comparing the 
performance of the P* model to that of just one other 
forecasting method. Experience in the Research De-
partment of the Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank 
suggests that the quarterly change in the yield of 90-day 
Treasury bills (T-bills) is helpful in forecasting infla-
tion. So, to construct an alternative model, I inserted this 
change into the Board's benchmark model. In the result-
ing model, when the yield on 90-day T-bills increases, 
the inflation forecast is higher than what a simple 
extrapolation of past inflation rates would indicate. 
Now I have two competing models: a P* model and a 
T-bill model. (For technical descriptions of these, see 
Appendix A.) How shall I compare them? The natural 
way to do that is to find out what would have happened 
if two forecasters had started out long ago—one with 
each model—and had used the models to periodically 
forecast inflation, using at the time of each forecast only 
the information real forecasters would have had. 
Thus, I started by giving each forecasting model all 
the available quarterly historical data it needs up to and 
including the fourth quarter of 1969.1 used these data to 
estimate the historical relationships between each 
model's variables. (In each model, the first period used 
for this estimation is the third quarter of 1960.
6) Then I 
had each model compute a series of one-year-ahead 
average inflation forecasts, each forecast using one 
more quarter of actual data. For example, I began with 
a forecast of the average inflation rate from the fourth 
quarter of 1969 to the fourth quarter of 1970 (which I 
dated 1970:4). Then I added the actual data for the first 
quarter of 1970 to both models' historical data, used the 
updated data to reestimate the variables' relationships, 
and computed a forecast of average inflation from the 
first quarter of 1970 to the first quarter of 1971. I 
proceeded in this way until I had a series of one-year-
ahead forecasts from the fourth quarter of 1970 
through the third quarter of 1989. To evaluate the 
models' longer-run performance, I also computed sets 
of two- and three-year-ahead forecasts in the same 
way. (For technical details of my procedures, see 
Appendix B.)
7 
The results of this test are shown in Charts 6-9. 
First consider Chart 6. Plotted there are the one-
year-ahead inflation forecasts of the P* and T-bill 
models and the corresponding actual inflation rates. 
Both the forecast and actual inflation rates are mea-
sured at an annual rate and in percentage terms. 
Perhaps the most noticeable thing on this chart is the 
way the forecasts seem to shadow, or lag, the actual 
inflation changes: instead of showing what inflation 
will be, these models seem to show what it has been. In 
that sense, neither model seems much of a forecasting 
tool. 
Overall in Chart 6, the two models perform about 
equally well. Note that the chart has, roughly, four 
episodes. In the first, which extends until the late 1970s, 
the two models' forecasts nearly coincide. In the 
second, around the turn of the decade, the T-bill model 
forecasts better than the P* model. But the reverse is 
true in the third episode: In the early 1980s, the P* 
model does better. In the final episode, during recent 
years, the two models' forecasts are close together 
again, though not as close as they were at first. 
Considering all four episodes, we must conclude that 
neither of these models is superior to the other. 
These observations are much clearer when we chart 
just the models' forecast errors. In Chart 6, the forecast 
error for any model is the vertical distance between the 
actual inflation rate and the model's forecast. Mathe-
matically, an error equals the actual minus the fore-
casted inflation rates, so positive numbers represent 
underpredictions; negative numbers, overpredictions. 
Chart 7 plots the forecast errors that correspond to 
the one-year-ahead forecasts in Chart 6. The episodic 
pattern we saw there is easier to see here: first the two 
models do about equally well, then the T-bill model 
6 My data set starts in the first quarter of 1959 because that is the first 
quarter for which M2 data are available. The estimation period starts in the 
third quarter of 1960 because the forecasting equation requires six initial 
observations on the price level: four reflecting the number of lags in the model 
and two more reflecting second-differencing of the price data. 
7 Each forecast of the P* model requires a forecast of P* itself. According to 
equation (3), the forecast of P* requires forecasts of M, V*, and Q*. Appendix B 
explains how forecasts of these variables were computed using only data that 
would have been available at the time of each forecast. 
Note that my calculations actually only approximate how well real fore-
casters would have been able to do with these models during the forecasting 
period. This is because I use revised data here, while real forecasters would have 
had to use preliminary data. 
8 Lawrence J. Christiano 
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Charts 6-9 
... And Quantitatively 
A Comparison of Predicted and Actual Annualized % Changes in the GNP Deflator 
Quarterly, 1970:4-1989:3t 
Predicted: _ P* Model Actual 
— T-Bill Model 
One-Year-Ahead Forecasts  Forecast Errors (Actual - Predicted) 
Chart 6 Inflation Rates  Chart 8 Two Years Ahead 
1970  1975  1980  1985  1970  1975  1980  1985 
Chart 7 Inflation Forecast Errors 
(Actual - Predicted) 
% Pts. 
6r 
Chart 9 Three Years Ahead 
1970  1975  1980  1985  1970  1975  1980  1985 
fAII the forecasts begin in 1969:4, but the curves in Charts 8 and 9 start later than the others because these curves are for longer forecast periods 
(two and three years, not just one). Throughout, each forecast is plotted on the last quarter of its period. For example, for the period starting in 
1969:4, the one-year-ahead forecast is plotted at 1970:4; the two-year-ahead forecast, at 1971:4; the three-year-ahead forecast, at 1972:4. 
For technical descriptions of the models, the forecasting procedures, and the forecasts, see Appendixes A, B, and C. 
Sources: Federal Reserve Board of Governors; U.S. Department of Commerce; 
Hallman, Porter, and Small 1989 
9 does better, then the P* model does better, and finally 
the two come together again. 
This same pattern appears in the two- and three-
year-ahead forecast errors, which are plotted in Charts 
8 and 9. Overall in these charts, the two models perform 
similarly, but there are subperiods in which one domi-
nates the other. 
In sum, neither the P* nor the T-bill model is clearly 
much better than the other at forecasting inflation from 
one to three years out.
8 A comparison of P* and seven 
other models (in Appendix C) produces the same result. 
If P* is, indeed, the inflation forecaster's holy grail, then 
there is little hint of it in the historical data. 
10 
8 For a formal quantitative analysis of the results in Charts 6-9, see 
Appendix C. Lawrence J. Christiano 
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Appendix A 
Describing the P* and T—Bill Models 
Here I describe the two competing models in the preceding 
paper: the P* model and the T-bill model. The P* model is 
Att, = a\o g(P?-i/P,-i) + ft Att^ + ftA7r,_2 
+ P3A7Tt-3 + j34A7T,_4 + ut 
where Pt is the quarterly price level; nt is the quarterly inflation 
rate, defined as irt = log(/J) — log^/J-!); A7i> = nt — 7i>_i; 
and ut is the regression error term. The T-bill model is the 
same as the above except that \og(P$L\IPt-{) is replaced by 
Rt-\ —Rt~2, where Rt is the average of annualized returns for 
90-day Treasury bills purchased in quarter t. Both models' 
parameters are estimated by the method of ordinary least 
squares. 
The accompanying table displays estimation results, based 
on data covering the period 1960:3-1989:3, for the T-bill 
model and two versions of the P* model. The two versions of 
the P* model use two different measures of P*: mine and the 
Board's. For reasons given in Appendix B, I could not use the 
Estimation of Inflation Models 
1960:3-1989:3 
Values (and Standard Errors) for Each Model 
Parameters 
and Statistics  Board P*  My />*  T—Bill 
a  .032  .021  .0012 
(.0085)  (.0077)  (.00042) 
ft  -.61  -.57  -.59  ft 
(.090)  (.089)  (.092) 
ft  -.44  -.39  -.40  ft 
(.10)  (.10)  (.10) 
ft  -.27  -.23  -.27  ft 
(.10)  (.10)  (.10) 
ft  -.13  -.094  -.13  ft 
(.087)  (.087)  (.090) 
Residual S.E.  .003960  .003984  .004064 
/?
2  .3172  .3087  .2808 
Board's measure of P* for the calculations reported in the 
paper. In the table, the coefficients of the P* model seem 
relatively insensitive to which measure of P* is used. This is 
consistent with the results reported in Appendix B, according 
to which forecasts from the P* model do not deteriorate when 
my measure of P* is used instead of the Board's. 
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Calculating the Forecasts 
Here I describe the calculations underlying Charts 6-9 in the 
preceding paper. Throughout, forecasts only use data avail-
able at the date of the forecast. Forecasts computed in this 
way are called real-time forecasts. 
Let ^59.4 and P-jq.a denote the price levels in the fourth 
quarters of 1969 and 1970. The actual average inflation rate 
between these quarters is log(P7o:4) — log(P69:4). To compute 
the forecast of this as of 1969:4, the P* model requires fore-
casts of P*o:i, P*o:2>
 and ^70:3*
 and the T-bill model requires 
forecasts of ARt for those periods. Here, A#70:i = R-jo:\ — 
^69:4-
Forecasts of P* require forecasts of V*, the Federal 
Reserve Board's M2 measure of money, and the full capacity 
level of output, Q*. Real-time forecasts of V* were computed 
using the sample mean of V from 1959:1 until the date of the 
forecast. Real-time forecasts of M2 were computed using this 
second-order autoregressive [AR(2)] model: 
(Bl) \og(M2t) = a0 + «ilo g(M2,_0 
+ a2\og(M2t-2) + et. 
When estimated over the period 1960:3-1989:3, the param-
eters of this model are as shown in the M2 column of Table 
Bl. The Box-Pierce Q-statistic and associated significance 
level indicate no significant serial correlation in the fitted 
residuals. 
Unfortunately, my attempts to construct a real-time ver-
sion of the Federal Reserve Board economists' measure of <2* 
were not successful. However, it turns out that the Board 
measure of Q* resembles an exponential trend for real GNP. 
This is fortunate, since an exponential trend model of Q* is 
easy to implement in real time. Thus, I modeled log(2*) at 
date r as ft) + P\t, where 0o and were obtained by least 
squares regressions of log(real GNP) on a constant and on 
time. 
The results of the following experiment suggest that the P* 
model is not placed at a disadvantage by using my measure of 
(2* rather than the Board's. I constructed a Board measure of 
P* for the period 1959:1-1989:3 using actual M2 and the 
Board's reported measure of Q* (Hallman, Porter, and Small 
1989). I constructed my version of P* for the same period 
using actual M2 and my measure of Q*, computed using 
estimates of /3q and obtained from real GNP data covering 
the period 1959:1-1989:3. In both versions of P*, the 
measure of V* used was the sample average of V over that 
Table B1 
Estimation of Money and Interest Rate Models 
1960:3-1989:3 
Parameter Values 
(and Standard Errors) 
for Each Modelf 
Lags on Explanatory 
Variable and Statistics M2 AR 
Zero  .012  .0435 
(.0058)  (.082) 
One  1.59  .20 
(.074)  (.089) 
Two  -.59  -.31 
(.074)  (.089) 
Residual S.E.  .0064  .88 
R2  .99992  .12 
0-Stat. at Lag 30  26.82  36.34 
Significance Level  .63  .20 
fThese models correspond to equations (B1) and (B2). 
period. I then computed out-of-sample one-, two-, and three-
year-ahead inflation forecast errors as I describe in the paper, 
except here I assumed that the whole time series on P* is 
known. My results are as shown in Table B2. Note that, in 
terms of both root mean squared error and bias, my measure 
of P* produces uniformly better forecasts than the Board's 
does. 
I obtained real-time forecasts of ARt for the T-bill model 
using this AR(2) model: 
(B2) A Rt = ft) + ft URt-i + Pi^Rt-i + vt-
When this model's parameters are estimated over the period 
1960:3-1989:3, the results are as shown in the AR column of 
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Table B2 Appendix C 
Comparison of Two Versions Analyzing the Forecasts 
of the P* Inflation Forecasting Model 
Root Mean Squared Errors 
Forecast (and Means) 
Horizons 
(Years) Board P* My P* 
One  1.41  1.35 
(.19)  (.020) 
Two  1.61  1.46 
(.28)  (-.0060) 
Three  1.81  1.55 
(.45)  (.030) 
Note: The forecast errors underlying these results 
are out of sample: for each forecast, the 
coefficients of the P* model are estimated 
using only data available at the time of the 
forecast. These forecast errors are not real 
time, however, since the forecasts use 
actual—not forecasted—values of P*. 
Table Bl. Here, too, the Q-statistic and associated signifi-
cance level indicate no significant serial correlation in the 
residuals. 
Here I further analyze the results in Charts 6-9 in the pre-
ceding paper, while also describing the results of other tests 
not detailed there. Besides the two models tested in the paper, 
I also examined the real-time forecasting performance of 
seven other models. The results of all the tests are the same: 
P* is not far superior to other simple methods of forecasting 
inflation. 
7 More Models and 3 Statistics 
Among the seven extra models are two money growth models 
and one term structure model. In the money growth models, 
I replaced Rt~\ — Rt-2 in the T-bill model (described in 
Appendix A) with log(M2,_1) — log(M2,_2) and with 
\og(MBt-i) — log(MZ?r_2), where MB is the Federal Reserve 
Board's measure of the monetary base. I used an AR(2) model 
[equation (B1) in Appendix B] to forecast M2 in the M2 model 
and an AR(2) model to forecast MB in the MB model. In the 
term structure model, I replaced Rt~\ — Rt-2 in the T-bill 
model with R\1 — Rt- \, where R\0 is the return on 10-year 
Treasury bonds. To forecast — R in this model, I used an 
AR(2). 
Besides these three models, I also considered four more. 
One is the benchmark model mentioned in the paper; it sim-
ply extrapolates inflation from its own past because it sets 
a = 0 in the P* model. Another I call combination; it com-






 explanatory variable to the P* model, 
where <5 is an unknown parameter to be estimated. I also used 
what I call a level T-bill model; it is the same as the T-bill 
model, except that it replaces log(/,* \/Pt-\) in the P* model 
with Rt-1 instead of Rt-\ — Rt-2 and it obtains forecasts of Rt 
using an AR(3) instead of an AR(2) model. The final model I 
call premium; it uses Rct-\ ~ Rt-1 instead of log(P,!i /Pt-\) in 
the P* model, where Rct is the yield on commercial paper. In 
the premium model, forecasts of Rct — Rt come from an AR(2) 
model. 
For each of the above seven models, I computed one-, 
two-, and three-year-ahead forecast errors using the same 
real-time procedure applied to the P* and T-bill models (as 
described in Appendix B). Then I used the forecast errors of all 
the models to compute three statistics by which to evaluate 
and compare their inflation forecasting performance. One of 
these statistics, the simple average of the forecast errors (or 
the mean), is designed to assess whether a model's forecasts 
are biased. The two others measure the typical absolute size of 
a model's forecast errors: the mean of the absolute values of 
13 the errors (the MAVE) and the square root of the mean 
squared error (the RMSE). The basic difference between these 
two is that the RMSE weighs large forecast errors relatively 
more heavily than the MAVE does. All three statistics are 
measured in percentage terms at an annual rate. 
The Results 
The results for each model at each forecast horizon are dis-
played in Table C1. 
Eyeballing the 3 Statistics 
Consider first the results for the P* and T-bill models, shown 
in the table's first two rows. They are based on the forecast 
errors in the paper's Charts 7-9, and they confirm the paper's 
conclusions: though on some dimensions one model seems to 
outperform the other, overall the two models perform about 
equally well. In terms of bias and average absolute error, the 
T-bill model outperforms the P* model at all three forecast 
horizons, but in terms of the RMSE, the P* model outperforms 
the T-bill model at all horizons. In either case, these 
differences seem too small to be economically or statistically 
significant. For example, in RMSE terms, the largest im-
provement from using the P* model rather than the T-bill 
model occurs at the three-year horizon. That improvement is 
a mere 0.15 of a percentage point, an economically negligible 
amount in view of the roughly 6 percent inflation we have 
averaged over the postwar period. Also, a glance back at 
Charts 7-9 shows that the magnitude of fluctuations in the 
forecast errors is much larger than 0.15 of a percentage point. 
This suggests that differences in RMSE of such magnitude are 
not statistically significant, or that the superior RMSE 
performance of the P* model can't be counted on to persist. 
The formal statistical analysis reported in the next subsection 
supports this conclusion. 
Bringing the results of the combination and benchmark 
models into the analysis offers additional ways to assess how 
much information about inflation is contained in P*. Thus, 
comparing the combination and T-bill model results shows 
that there is little information in P* that is not already in T-bill 
yield changes. Incorporating P* into the T-bill model (to get 
the combination model) reduces the bias and magnitude of 
the T-bill model's forecast errors by a trivial amount. 
Comparing the benchmark and P* model results suggests a 
sense in which P* actually contains disinformation about 
inflation. According to the mean and MAVE, introducing P* 
Table C1 
Comparison of Real-Time Performance of Nine Inflation Forecasting Models 
Measured by Three Statistics! 
(The shaded numbers identify the best model in each column.) 
Models 
Value of Each Statistic at Each Forecast Horizon (Years) 
Models 
One  Two  Three 
Models  Mean  MAVE  RMSE  Mean  MAVE  RMSE  Mean  MAVE  RMSE 
P*t  .38  1.26  1.53  .55  1.46  1.74  .79  1.71  1.98 
T-Bill  -.12  1.22  1.58  -.26  1.37  1.84  -.39  1.65  2.13 
Combination  .15  1.18  1.54  .17  1.37  1.73  .24  1.64  1.99 
Benchmark  -.07  1.25  1.60  -.16  1.38  1.86  -.24  1.64  2.09 
M2  -.34  1.30  1.70  -.58  1.44  2.01  -.83  1.72  2.29 
MB  -.62  1.31  1.72  -1.0  1.60  2.14  -1.5  2.02  2.58 
Term Structure  .05  1.32  1.67  -.025  1.48  1.93  -.10  1.69  2.14 
Level T-Bill  -.44  1.30  1.76  -.74  1.55  2.22  -1.1  2.00  2.71 
Premium  -.32  1.31  1.72  -.54  1.47  2.10  -.76  1.84  2.45 
fThe mean is the simple average of the model's forecast errors, the MAVE is the mean of the absolute values of those errors, and the RMSE is the square 
root of the mean squared error. 
tThe results in this row are based on the version of the P* model that uses my measure of P*, not the Board's. For details on the two versions, see 
Appendix B. 
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Table C2 
A Closer Look at the Models' Root Mean Squared Errors 
Difference Between the RMSEs of the Indicated Model and the P* Model 
and /-Statistic Associated With That Difference! 
Values at Each Forecast Horizon (Years) 
One  Two  Three 
Models  Diff.  /-Stat.  Diff.  /-Stat.  Diff.  /-Stat. 
T-Bill  .048  .30  .099  .37  .15  .40 
Combination  .0070  .07  -.0059  -.04  .0075  .04 
Benchmark  .065  .44  .12  .51  .12  .32 
M2  .16  .77  .27  .80  .32  .65 
MB  .19  .79  .40  1.1  .60  1.2 
Term Structure  .13  .95  .19  .84  .16  .44 
Level T-Bill  .22  .92  .48  1.2  .73  1.3 
Premium  .18  .88  .36  1.1  .47  .99 
tEach /-statistic is the ratio of the difference in RMSEs (the indicated model's minus the P* model's) to the 
standard error of that difference. For an argument that this ratio has, approximately, a standard normal 
distribution under the null hypothesis that the underlying RMSE difference is actually zero, see Appendix D. 
into the benchmark model (to get the P* model) reduces 
forecast accuracy at all horizons. 
What evidence there is that P* improves inflation forecasts 
appears to be greater when the P* model is compared with the 
remaining five models. This improvement in forecast perfor-
mance seems most pronounced with the RMSEs. For exam-
ple, at the three-year horizon, the level T-bill model's RMSE 
is 0.73 of a percentage point higher than the P* model's. But 
even RMSE differences of this magnitude are not statistically 
significant. 
Formally Analyzing 1 Statistic 
To determine that, I computed /-statistics for testing the null 
hypothesis that the true RMSE of the P* model is identical to 
that of each of the other eight models. For any model and 
forecast horizon, this /-statistic is just the ratio of the dif-
ference between the model's RMSE and P*'s RMSE to the 
standard error of that difference. In Appendix D, I argue that 
these /-statistics have, approximately, a standard normal 
distribution under the null hypothesis that the true underlying 
RMSE differences are in fact zero. 
The /-statistics are displayed in Table C2. For conve-
nience, the RMSE differences—the numerators in the /-statis-
tic ratios—are also displayed there. (Apart from discrepancies 
due to rounding, the RMSE differences can be obtained by 
subtracting the appropriate elements in Table CI.) The fact 
that all but one of the differences are positive reflects the fact 
that all but one of the P* model's RMSEs are lower than those 
of the other models. 
Despite that, the /-statistics in Table C2 are all consistent 
with the hypothesis that each model's true RMSE perfor-
mance is actually identical to that of the P* model. All of the 
/-statistics are very close to zero, the central tendency of the 
standard normal distribution. For example, the /-statistic for 
the T-bill model's one-year-ahead forecasts is only 0.30. The 
probability that a standard normal random variable will 
exceed 0.30, in absolute value, is 76 percent. Even the largest 
/-statistics, those in the last four rows of the table, are quite 
small. For example, the probability of a standard normal 
random variable exceeding (in absolute value) 1.3, the largest 
/-statistic in the table, is 19 percent, t 
The Conclusion 
Thus, my analysis has failed to turn up any convincing 
fSome readers of early drafts of this paper were concerned that the 
simplicity of the AR(2) representation I used to forecast money for the P* 
model may have placed that model at an unfair disadvantage. They suggested 
15 evidence that P* far outperforms other models as an inflation 
forecaster. In my tests, P* does worse than its competitors on 
some dimensions and better on others. The dimension on 
which P* looks best is the estimated RMSE of its forecast 
errors. But the superiority of P* on this dimension is so small 
that it could just reflect dumb luck. 
Appendix D 
Rationalizing the Use 
of the Standard Normal Distribution 
an alternative procedure which avoids the need to forecast other variables when 
forecasting inflation: use annual or biennial rather than quarterly observations 
to forecast inflation one or two years out. Note that, effectively, this procedure 
throws away a large number of observations. Other things the same, one expects 
that to result in a deterioration in forecast performance. Still, to investigate this 
suggestion, I used annual data to compute a set of real-time, one-year-ahead 
forecast errors using annual versions of my P*, T-bill, combination, and 
benchmark models. I found that the forecast performance of all these models is 
generally inferior to that of their quarterly counterparts. Moreover, the annual 
P* model forecasts less well than all of my quarterly models: the quarterly T-bill 
and benchmark models beat it in terms of all three of my statistics, and the other 
quarterly models beat it in terms of two of the three, the mean and the MAVE. 
Here I explain why the r-statistics in Appendix C's Table C2 
can be interpreted as though they were drawn from the 
standard normal distribution. 
An Approximation 
Let 7 denote the estimator underlying the numbers in any of 
the differences columns in that table. Thus, 7 is the estimated 
RMSE for the forecasts of one of the models in the table minus 
the corresponding RMSE for the forecasts of the P* model. 
Let 7 denote the underlying true RMSE difference. This is 
what 7 would be if it were computed using an unlimited 
number of observations instead of the 70-odd data points that 
are actually available. I use Hansen's (1982) generalized 
method of moments formula to estimate the standard error of 
7. To a first approximation, the ratio of 7 to this standard 
error (the r-statistic discussed in Appendix C) has an asymp-
totic standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis 
that 7 is zero. 
To use Hansen's standard error formula, I must express 7 
as the solution to the sample analog of some first-moment 
condition. To keep the notation simple, I describe here just the 
calculations for the T-bill model's one-year-ahead forecast 
errors. The calculations for all the other models and forecast 
horizons are analogous. 
To start, define this 2 X 1 random variable: 
(Dl) ht(y,o) = {7(7 + 2a] - e(AR,t)2 + e(P*,0
2, 
o2-e(P*,t)2}' 
where a is the RMSE for the P* model's forecasts and e(AR,t) 
and e(P*,t) are the date t one-year-ahead forecast errors 
from the T-bill and P* models. Also, 7 = or — a, where or is 
the RMSE for the T-bill model's forecasts, so that 717 + 2o] 
= o\ — o2. Therefore, if a is the (unknown) true value of a, 
then Eht(7, a) = 0 for each t. This is the first-moment 
condition that underlies my estimator of 7 (and a). 
The sample analog of this condition is 
(D2) gT(y,o) = {y[y + 2a] 




Here T is the number of observations used in the RMSE 
calculations (76, 72, and 68 for the one-, two-, and three-
year-ahead forecast errors). It is easy to confirm that my 
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estimators of y and o (the 7 defined above and the estimated 
RMSE of the P* model's forecast errors) uniquely satisfy 
gr( yfi) = 0. 
Now define 
(D3) DT= dgT(y,o)/d(y,o) 
evaluated at 7 = 7 and o = a. Hansen (1982) shows that if 
ht(7,a) is strictly stationary and other regularity conditions 
are satisfied, then for large T 
(D4) ^ \ J is normally distributed with mean £ T J and 
variance V 
where Vis a positive definite matrix consistently estimated by 
(D5) V = (Dj)~1S(Df 1 / T. 
Here S is a matrix that I will explain in the next paragraph. 
Meanwhile, we can already see by (D4) and (D5) that the 
estimated standard error of 7 is the square root of the first 
diagonal element of V. (The square root of the second 
diagonal element is Hansen's estimator of the standard error 
of a.) For the T-bill model's one-year-ahead forecast errors, 
the standard error of 7 is 0.16, thus accounting for the 0.30 
/-statistic in Table C2. (The standard errors of 0 at the one-, 
two-, and three-year-ahead horizons are 0.18, 0.20, and 
0.40.) 
To return to S in (D5): It is a consistent estimator of 5, the 
spectral density at frequency zero of ht(y,5). In particular, 
(D6) 5 = X~=-ooE{ht(y,8)[ht-k(y,d)Y}. 
Both S and S are 2 X 2 matrices, and S is assumed to be 
positive definite under the regularity conditions. My estimator 
of S, 5, replaces the population second moments on the right 
side of (D6) by their sample counterparts and truncates the 
summation for \k\ >6. In addition, I linearly damp higher-
order covariances according to the formula of Doan (1988, 
p. 14-143) with 6 = 1. 
A Hitch? 
An attractive feature of Hansen's estimator of the variance-
covariance of (7,5) is that it is robust to autocorrelation and 
conditional heteroscedasticity in ht(7,a). However, as Chris-
topher Sims has pointed out to me, Hansen's stationarity 
requirement may not be satisfied. After all, model parameter 
estimates are based on less data at the beginning of a sample 
period than at the end. Therefore, forecast errors may have 
larger variance at the beginning than at the end. 
Charts 7-9 in the paper give (slight) support for this 
possibility. Thus, it may be worthwhile to investigate whether 
failure of Hansen's stationarity assumption substantially af-
fects my standard error estimates. Still, I suspect that it does 
not, for my results are very strong. To overturn my conclusion 
about the comparable RMSE performance of the P* and 
T-bill models, for example, would require showing that my 
/-statistics are biased downward by a factor of at least five. 
This is because the largest of those /-statistics is 0.4 and 
rejecting a null hypothesis at the conventional 5 percent sig-
nificance level requires a /-statistic roughly equal to 2. 
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